

TACTICAL PURSUIT AND THE MORAL DOMAIN: WHY ARMIES LACK THE WILL TO PURSUE

**A Monograph
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
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ABSTRACT

TACTICAL PURSUIT AND THE MORAL DOMAIN: WHY ARMIES LACK THE WILL TO PURSUE by MAJ Frank J. Abbott, USA, 59 pages.

This monograph discusses the moral factors of warfare as they apply to the tactical pursuit. Throughout Western military history, there have been battles in which a victorious army had the opportunity to pursue, but chose to allow the enemy to escape. In many cases, the victors did not conduct an energetic pursuit because they lacked the will to do so.

The monograph first reviews some non-moral reasons why battlefield victors choose not to pursue. The monograph then examines the factors that influence man's will in wartime. Next, the monograph looks at the moral reasons why vigorous pursuits did not happen after Gettysburg, El Alamein, and the Desert Storm ground offensive. Lastly, the monograph offers recommendations for today's U.S. Army in addressing the problems of the tactical pursuit and the moral domain.

The monograph concludes that in many cases armies do not conduct vigorous tactical pursuits because their leaders and soldiers lack the will to pursue. This lack of will allows the enemy to escape and fight again. Leaders must understand and address the influences that deter this will so that the U.S. Army can fully exploit its battlefield victories.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, when writing about the exploitation of a battlefield victory, concluded that

the importance of the victory is chiefly determined by the vigor with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In other words, pursuit makes up the second act of the victory and in many cases is more important than the first.¹

Military theorists and historians are virtually unanimous in recognizing the importance of the pursuit. The pursuit, which is an attack against a fleeing enemy force, denies the opponent the opportunity of escaping, reorganizing his forces, and then fighting again. An aggressive pursuit secures battlefield success; without pursuit, "victory may yield only transient results."²

The pursuit, however, has been a strikingly uncommon feature throughout Western military history. Historian Michael Howard writes that failing to pursue is "the most common of all military faults."³ Anthropologist and military historian Harry Holbert Turney-High, noting that the principle of the pursuit is frequently disregarded, wonders, "Why all this bloodshed to win a battlefield victory unless one intends to convert it into a shortening or finishing of

a war?"⁴

In some cases, battlefield commanders choose not to pursue for tactical, operational, or strategic reasons. These explanations, however, do not explain those situations in which a victorious army had the opportunity to pursue aggressively, but did not. Another explanation is to be found in the moral domain of war; that is, men often lack the will to pursue because a vigorous pursuit is against their nature.

This monograph examines the tactical pursuit and the moral domain. The first part of the monograph briefly examines the tactical, operational, and strategic reasons for not pursuing. Turning to the moral domain, the second part illustrates the physiological, traditional, and philosophical factors that impact on man's will to pursue. With this foundation, the third part examines three battles: Gettysburg, El Alamein, and the ground offensive of Operation Desert Storm. After each of these battles, an aggressive pursuit was possible but not conducted primarily because the victor lacked the will to pursue. The fourth part suggests ways in which the U.S. Army today can counter this phenomenon of lacking the will to pursue and thus ensure that the next battlefield victory is not "transient."

II. WHY NO PURSUIT? TACTICAL, OPERATIONAL, AND STRATEGIC EXPLANATIONS

In some cases there are tactical reasons why pursuits do not happen. After achieving victory on the battlefield, an army may not be capable of pursuing. Clausewitz noted that combat could exhaust an army's soldiers and leaders and that the winning force may be very disorganized.⁵ Additionally, the victory may deplete the materiel the force needs to conduct a pursuit. For example, when the Confederate army defeated the Union forces in the First Battle of Bull Run, the victors found that they lacked the food, ammunition, transportation, and weapons necessary to pursue.⁶

Even if an army has the resources to pursue, pursuit is still a difficult operation. The retreating force often has the advantage, given that the opposing sides have similar weapons or that the pursuers are not more mobile. A withdrawing force can down trees and destroy bridges to slow the pursuing force. It can also form a rear guard, forcing the pursuers to change from a march to a combat formation. As the rear guard flees, the pursuer must reassume its march formation and then continue. The resulting delays never allow the pursuing force to catch up to its enemy.⁷

Additionally, pursuit has its risks. A pursuing

force, in its attempt to catch the fleeing enemy, may lose its mass and be vulnerable to ambushes and counterattacks. In the Battle of Aigition (426 B.C.), the Aitolian forces withdrew from the Athenians. In their pursuit, the Athenians lost their massed phalanx formation. The Aitolians then launched arrows and javelins, killing one Athenian general and 120 hoplites.⁸ In the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.), Alexander the Great feigned retreat. When his foes open their ranks during their pursuit, Alexander crushed them with his heavy cavalry.⁹ This tactic of feigning retreat, inducing pursuers to lose mass, and then counterattacking also appeared later in a Byzantine military treatise, along with anti-pursuit measures.¹⁰

An army may also choose not to pursue for operational or strategic reasons. After the Battle of Gaugamela (330 B.C.), the Persian King Darius fled towards the northeast. Alexander the Great chose not to pursue, for he understood that he first had to capture the Mediterranean ports to the south. These ports were the key to resupplying his force during his campaign.¹¹ In 1866, after defeating the Austrians at the Battle of Sadowa, the Prussians chose not to pursue because they believed that their political objectives had been met; pursuit was unnecessary.¹²

Although these explanations--tactical, operational, and strategic--are reasons why a victor does not pursue a fleeing enemy, they are not the only reasons. There is an additional explanation to be found in the moral domain; that is, men often do not have the will to pursue. Noting this phenomenon, Frederick the Great stated:

Never is an army less disposed for fighting than immediately after a victory. Everybody is beside himself with joy, the great mass is charmed to have escaped the extreme dangers to which they were exposed, and no person is anxious to face them again at once.¹³

Clausewitz, also noting this lack of will, stated that after a victory each soldier "longs for nothing so much as a few hours free of danger and fatigue."¹⁴

The will to pursue may not only be lacking in the common foot soldier, but in field commanders also. Clausewitz observed that these generals, who are physically and mentally exhausted, become handicapped by "the whole weight of human needs and weaknesses" as soldiers and senior officers call for a respite.¹⁵ In addition, most generals tend not to risk their certain victory by launching a pursuit which could prove disastrous. They therefore are "content to remain in possession of the field" of their initial victory.¹⁶

Frederick the Great and Clausewitz ascribe this lack of will to an attempt to avoid danger; the soldiers do not wish to risk their lives again and the

generals do not wish to risk their certain victory. Although these observations are valid, they are not the only reasons that explain the absence of the will to pursue. There are physiological, traditional, and philosophical reasons as well.

III. WHY NO PURSUIT? PHYSIOLOGICAL, TRADITIONAL, AND PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS

There are three interrelated factors that influence, and most often deter, man's will to pursue. First, there is a physiological influence within man that causes him to lose his will to be aggressive once he has achieved dominance. Secondly, Western society inherited from the ancient Greeks the strong tradition of avoiding pursuit. Finally, Western societies have philosophical influences, both secular and religious, that deter pursuit; these influences later evolved into just war doctrine. These physiological, traditional, and philosophical factors all influence man's will to pursue by limiting his aggressiveness.

A. PHYSIOLOGICAL INFLUENCES

Man's physiology plays a large part in his aggression. To understand this link between man's

physiology and his aggression, an examination of animal aggression is useful.

Animals that live in groups, such as lions, apes, and chickens, all abide by the norms established within that group. Among these social animals there is a system of rank ordering within the group. All members of the group hold a specific rank, and all members understand who holds the more dominate status. Each member knows to whom he must defer and over whom he may dominate. This "system of dominance" ensures order within the animals' society, for "it is an order founded on fear."¹⁷

The primary reason an animal fights one of its own species, then, is to establish dominance within a group or to gain certain territorial rights.¹⁸ This intraspecific aggression, however, rarely results in killing. When a animal becomes aggressive, a series of physiological changes occur in the body to prepare it for fighting (e.g., increases in blood pressure and adrenalin). The animal serves notice of its intentions through such acts as roaring or swiping at the air. It thus attempts to scare its opponent into submission and achieve dominance without fighting at all.

If the animal's opponent does not back down, though, a fight occurs, involving physical blows, scratching, or pecking. Once one combatant begins to

lose the fight, it gives off submissive physical or auditory signals. These signals produce a physiological response in the dominating animal, causing it to lose its aggressive will. Both combatants, then, become less aggressive and the fighting stops. The victor achieves the objective for which it was fighting. The loser remains alive and continues to live in the society.

This series of events occurs even in carnivores, who have the ability to kill but do not use this ability against their own species. The natural process of aggression, then, provides for an orderly manner to settle disputes without killing. This process serves to preserve the species, for a species that routinely kills its own kind would eventually perish.

Why, then, has man, who does kill his own species in warfare,¹⁹ avoided extinction? The answer lies in man's physiology and how it affects his aggression. Ethologist Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt explains man's aggressive behavior through his theory of biological and cultural norms.²⁰ He maintains that both man and animals have biological norm filters that forbid the killing of one's own species (intraspecific), but allow for the killing of another species (interspecific). All social carnivores, including man, are therefore naturally capable of killing other species for food.

Man, however, also has a cultural norm filter that not only allows him to kill his own species, but at times demands that he do so. When at war, societies usually must take special measures to ensure that its citizens will kill the enemy. Such measures include demanding obedience to the society's authority and generating intolerance for the foe. A common technique is to de-humanize the opponent--a glaring recognition that interspecific aggression is much easier to commit than intraspecific aggression. If the enemy is not perceived as human, man's biological norm filter allows for the killing of the foe.

To understand man's behavior in war, then, Eibl-Eibesfeldt points to how man's biological norms and cultural norms conflict. The biological norm forbids the killing of another man. During war, the cultural norm demands such an act. The rank ordering of these norms is often in flux and can change rapidly. Man's desire for peace, Eibl-Eibesfeldt concludes, is a desire to avoid such a conflict of norms.

Political scientist Richard Gabriel offers another explanation: the cerebral cortex. As man's brain developed through the centuries, man became capable of forming concepts such as "good, evil, God, justice, revenge, and ideology."²¹ Man therefore became capable of fighting for such conceptual realities, not just for

the necessities of survival. The development of the cerebral cortex allows man to override the restraints inherent in animal behavior, thus permitting him to kill his own species.

Gabriel states that the physiological reactions that cause an animal to stop short of killing "seem to persist in man although they have clearly atrophied."²² The human mind, with its developed cerebral cortex, has no biological mechanism for limiting aggression short of killing. Since man often fights for conceptual realities, "the connection between mounting sufficient aggression to obtain them and the means employed has no objective basis."²³ For Gabriel, then, man's aggression cannot stop short of killing.

A look at Western military history shows that man can indeed kill, but there are limits to his killing. The general pattern of battles and wars is that once a belligerent has achieved dominance over its opponent, the bloodshed stops. When an army shows submissive behavior by surrendering or by fleeing the battlefield, the victors lose their will to continue the killing: those surrendering are usually taken prisoner and those fleeing are usually allowed to escape. This phenomenon shows that the physiological reactions that cause a reduction in aggression have not atrophied in man to the extent that Gabriel believes. Put in Eibl-

Eibesfeldt's terms, once an opponent shows submissive signs, the biological norm of the victor once again rules over the cultural norm, and the carnage ceases.

Man, therefore, seeks dominance. He will kill his own species, but this killing will continue only to the point at which he believes that he has achieved this dominance. This phenomenon, grounded in man's physiological nature, is evident in the mechanisms that man creates to limit the killing in war. In Western military history, these mechanisms trace their roots to the ancient Greeks and later evolved into just war doctrine. These traditional roots discourage pursuit operations.

B. TRADITIONAL INFLUENCES

Ancient Greek civilization provided the foundation for many of the Western world's social and political attitudes. Gabriel notes that the Greeks' morality of war "entered the mainstream of Western civilization and remained the main intellectual force that shaped professional perceptions of war over sixteen centuries."²⁴ Historian Victor Davis Hanson agrees, stating that Western attitudes about war and battle are remarkably similar to those held by the Classical Greeks.²⁵

A central theme of this morality of war is the desire to limit casualties. Prior to 750 B.C., Greek societies often practiced monomachia, or one-on-one combat, to settle disputes between warring parties. In this single combat, each side's commanding general or best warrior fought to determine the outcome of the entire war. The result of this single combat was not always accepted--at times the opposing armies fought anyway--but often the result did prevail.²⁶

The Classical period (750 - 323 B.C.) saw the fading of monomachia and the emergence of the famous Greek phalanx style of combat. Opposing Greek armies met on an open battlefield and fought until one side's phalanx formation broke and its soldiers fled. The tradition of this phalanx warfare was that the outcome of this single fight determined the outcome of the war. On average, a losing army's casualty rate was fourteen percent; the winner's rate was about five percent.²⁷ This type of warfare was in keeping with the Greek desire to keep warfare limited in time and in casualties. As Hanson notes, Greek hoplite battle developed as a means to "limit warfare (and hence killing) to a single, brief, nightmarish occasion."²⁸

This desire to keep war brief and to limit casualties resulted in a sustained pursuit being a rare occurrence. Pursuit, if it did occur, was usually

limited to the immediate battlefield; the victors rarely chased the fleeing opponents for long distances. Part of the reason was that the phalanx formation, with its slow, massed movement, did not lend itself to conducting pursuit operations. Some Greek armies did have cavalry; however, such formations served minor roles in combat, primarily flank security and skirmishing.²⁹

Why did the Greeks fail to develop formations and tactics to conduct pursuits? After the enemy fled, notes Hanson, "further killing was not merely senseless but unnecessary as well."³⁰ The Greeks did not seek the complete destruction of the enemy, for a victorious Greek army believed that it could simply repeat its success should the enemy regroup and attack again. "Besides," Hanson states, "it was always good propaganda for a Greek general to profess no taste for slaughtering fellow Hellenes from the rear after the issue of battle had already been decided face-to-face."³¹

The Greek desire to limit war and its destructiveness demonstrates how man's physiological mechanisms to control aggression still exist. In war, the Greeks sought only dominance, not unlimited killing. Once an opponent sent submissive signals by fleeing the battlefield, the victor stopped the

killing. Pursuit was "unnecessary" since dominance had been established. With the advent of Christianity, this desire to limit aggression evolved over several centuries into just war doctrine.

C. PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES

The just war tradition began to develop in Medieval Europe, although its basic concepts are rooted in Judeo-Christian thought and in the classical Greek and Roman heritages. The chivalric codes of Medieval Europe sought to limit casualties and to enforce a ritualized style of warfare.³² From these codes, just war doctrine evolved into a guide for nation-states in deciding when to use force (jus ad bello) and what type and amount of force to use (jus in bello).

The intent of just war doctrine is to deter wars from starting by providing rules that govern when nation-states can "legitimately" wage war. If a nation-state decides to wage war, the doctrine dictates how the war may be properly prosecuted. The doctrine, as its name implies, is based on achieving justice. The use of violence is justified only if it serves to correct an injustice.³³

One of the principles of the just war doctrine is proportionality. Concerning jus ad bello, there is a

proportionality of good over evil, which "requires that the harm wrought by a war must not be greater than the good it achieves."³⁴ Proportionality of means, concerning jus in bello, places a moral limit on the use of military force which demands "the least destructive ways to defeat [enemy] forces or render them ineffective so as to achieve . . . legitimate ends."³⁵

Although just war doctrine does not forbid an army from conducting a pursuit, the doctrine certainly discourages pursuit. In medieval Europe, for example, pursuit was condemned as dishonorable, for "it was unchivalrous to slay a foe who was half-dead."³⁶ During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization maintained a policy to restore the international German border should the Warsaw Pact forces invade.

Under just war doctrine, then, an army that unjustly invades a neighbor's territory may be expelled from that territory, but proportionality would forbid chasing the invaders beyond the status quo ante border. When the legitimate end (i.e., expelling the invaders) is met, the war must stop. When the wrong has been righted, the killing must stop.

In the context of the moral domain, then, there are three interrelated explanations as to why pursuits

do not happen. First, there is in man a physiological mechanism that causes him to lose his will to fight once he has achieved dominance. Second, the ancient Greeks, the holders of the Western military tradition, avoided the pursuit. This avoidance reflects man's physiological mechanism, for the Greeks stopped the killing once they established dominance on the battlefield. Finally, the philosophy of just war, in keeping with the Greek traditions of limiting wars and their destructiveness, preaches a proportionality of means. This proportionality maintains that in order to bring justice to an unjust situation the use of military force must be kept to the minimum amount necessary. Once the unjust enemy has fled the battlefield and the injustice righted, pursuit is not necessary or legitimate.

These physiological, traditional, and philosophical influences explain why victorious armies often do not rigorously pursue the fleeing enemy. An examination of three battles shows how powerful these influences are.

IV. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

The battlefield victors of Gettysburg, El Alamein, and the ground offensive in Operation Desert Storm

witnessed their opponents fleeing the battlefield. In each case, the victors did not conduct an energetic pursuit. In each case, the decision not to hunt down and destroy the fleeing enemy had unfortunate or appalling consequences. In each case, absence of the will to pursue played a significant role.

A. GETTYSBURG³⁷

As the sun rose on July 4, 1863, the situation looked bleak for the Confederate Army. The previous day's attack on the Union lines, led by General George E. Pickett,³⁸ was a failure; Pickett's forces suffered over fifty percent casualties. In three days of fighting, the South had lost 28,000 men. General Robert E. Lee,³⁹ commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, realized that he did not have the military strength to continue his attack into Union territory. He had to regroup his remaining forces and withdraw to the south.

Upon seeing the Confederate attack fail, the Union forces of General George G. Meade⁴⁰ were jubilant. Soldiers cheered; bands played. Union officers delighted in dragging captured Confederate battle flags behind their horses. This merriment soon subsided as the Northern soldiers realized that they had suffered over 23,000 casualties themselves over the previous

three days. One witness wrote, "Neither Meade nor Lee, just at that time, was anxious to bring about a renewal of the fight, and the time was occupied in caring for the wounded and burying the dead."⁴¹

Rain moved into the area that night. Lee used the poor weather to make good his escape. The Union forces did not realize that Lee had withdrawn until mid-morning the next day. Meade then began a lethargic pursuit, taking a full week to catch up to Lee near Falling Waters, West Virginia. Lee had found himself trapped there, for back on July 3d a Union detachment destroyed the bridge. The recent rains had swollen the river, preventing his army from swimming across. Meade, however, did not attack. Lee used this respite to build a make-shift bridge from the wood of local buildings, and began crossing the river on July 13th. Lee's Confederate forces escaped. Lee went on to fight for two more years; the Civil War did not end until he surrendered at Appomattox.

For allowing Lee to escape, Meade received much criticism. President Abraham Lincoln, who thought that Meade should have conducted a vigorous pursuit, later told Meade that his actions reminded him of "an old woman trying to shoo her geese across a creek."⁴² Meade's own soldiers mocked him, singing, "Then came General Meade, a slow old plug/For he let Lee away from

Gettysburg" to the tune of "When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again."⁴³

Why was Meade so slow to pursue? When Meade's forces caught up to the Confederates who were trapped on the north side of the Potomac, why did Meade not attack? The answer lies in the character of the Civil War soldier and in the character of Meade himself.

At the start of the Civil War, Southerners referred to enemy soldiers as immigrants, European marauders, and "the refuse of the earth." To the soldiers of the North, Southerners were traitors.⁴⁴ This name-calling was clearly an attempt to de-humanize the enemy and thus to make the killing interspecific. As mentioned earlier,⁴⁵ interspecific killing is easier than intraspecific killing.

After the initial battles of the war, however, both sides began to respect each other. Eventually, "expressions of deep hatred [for the enemy] were rare."⁴⁶ During periods of inactivity, soldiers initiated truces to trade goods. Those serving on picket duty adopted a tradition of avoiding aggressive action; firing on pickets soon came to be considered assassination. Pickets eventually passed warnings to the enemy if an attack were imminent.⁴⁷

This chivalrous attitude led to a lack of ferocity. Commanders, therefore, had problems in

getting their soldiers to decisively rout the enemy after an initial success. These commanders often cited unit fatigue or disorganization as reasons that they did not chase a fleeing enemy, "but there was as well a lack of zeal for the pursuit of those forced to retreat."⁴⁸

If there was indeed such a mutual respect between North and South, how could the larger battles of the Civil War have been so fierce and bloody? Historian Gerald Linderman writes that the fighting was very violent when both sides "perceived that their courage was being tested."⁴⁹ When the soldiers did not believe that the situation was appropriate for a contest of courage, there was a lack of ferocity.

Additionally, Linderman argues, since the soldiers on both sides valued their own courage, they also came to respect the courage of their opponents. The result was to weaken the will to kill the enemy. After witnessing the failure of Pickett's Charge, one Union sergeant remarked that no charge was "more daring"; other Northern witnesses expressed "unbounded sympathy."⁵⁰ These Northern soldiers understood and respected the courage of the Confederates. "With growing awareness of the enemy's courage," Linderman writes, "one's reactions might progress from regret that a brave opponent had been killed, to hope that

another would not be, to demonstrations of pleasure and congratulation that he had not been."⁵¹

Put in Eibl-Eibesfeldt's terms, the soldiers of the Civil War allowed their cultural norm to dominate only when their courage was being challenged. When the situation no longer challenged their courage, the biological norm took over, and the will to kill declined. This drastic shifting of rank between the cultural and biological norm explains at least in part why a vigorous pursuit did not happen after Gettysburg, and why successful pursuit was so uncommon during the entire war.⁵²

But what of Meade himself? R. Ernest Dupuy writes that after the victory at Gettysburg, Meade, "who held the fate of the Southern Confederacy in his hands, failed to reap the fruits of complete victory by swift, unrelenting pursuit."⁵³ Shelby Foote blames the lethargy of Meade's pursuit on his excessive caution,⁵⁴ but this is not the complete explanation.

After the victory at Gettysburg became clear, many of Meade's subordinates offered their advice on the Union Army's next move. Winfield Scott Hancock and Alfred Pleasanton urged an immediate pursuit. Henry Hunt, believing that Lee would be prepared for a Union pursuit, stated that such an action would be "rash in the extreme." Meade, believing that Lee would rally

and once again attack the Union lines, rejected the idea of pursuit, stating, "We have done well enough."⁵⁵ Meade therefore spent July 4th resting and reorganizing his units.

During this respite, however, Meade did issue a communique to his troops. "Our task is not yet accomplished," he wrote, "And the commanding general looks to the army for greater efforts to drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader."⁵⁶ Upon hearing of this message, Lincoln responded, "My God, is that all?"⁵⁷

These incidents reveal much of Meade's character. First, he appeared very satisfied with the sure victory that he had won at Gettysburg. Launching a strong pursuit could have put this certain victory at risk. In physiological terms, he had clearly established dominance over Lee. With this dominance established, Meade concluded that the Union had "done well enough."

Additionally, Meade perceived his mission as being to drive "the invaders" from Union soil. Had Meade intended to destroy Lee's forces, an unrelenting pursuit was the required action. Meade, however, intended only to push Lee back into Confederate territory. Although Meade did not use just war doctrinal terms in his communications, his actions agree with the just war principle of proportionality.

Meade must have perceived the Confederates' unjust act as invading the North, not seceding from the Union. Proportionality, then, required only that the Southerners be expelled from the North. To Meade, the destruction of Lee's army through an unrelenting pursuit was not necessary. A lethargic chasing of Lee to ensure he retreated into the South would accomplish the task.

Meade, a West Point graduate of 1835, failed to heed the words of one of West Point's finest instructors, Dennis Hart Mahan:

A battle gained is always a fine thing; but . . . [if we] simply force him to retreat without further loss than that on the battlefield . . . the enemy will soon be able to rally his forces and offer a new battle."⁵⁶

Meade's lack of will to conduct a relentless pursuit allowed Lee to fight for two more years.

Eighty years later, half-way around the world, another general would conduct a lethargic pursuit. Bernard Law Montgomery's cautious style allowed Erwin Rommel to slip away at El Alamein. That prime opportunity gone, the Allies had to fight for six more months to expel the Axis forces from North Africa.

B. EL ALAMEIN

The World War II fighting in North Africa began in

September 1940. For the following two years, the British and the Axis Powers (Germany and Italy) fought in a seesaw fashion. One side would conduct a major offensive. When that offensive culminated, the other side would launch its own offensive. Each offensive lasted one to three months and covered hundreds of miles. The British needed to break the back of the Axis Powers' resistance in North Africa in order to set favorable conditions for an Allied invasion of southern Europe.

Britain hoped that General (later Field Marshal) Bernard Law Montgomery⁵⁹ would be the key to success. Montgomery, who took command of the British Eighth Army in August 1942, immediately prepared to take the offensive. Strengthened with 300 U.S. Sherman tanks and 100 U.S. self-propelled guns, Montgomery swore "to hit the Axis forces right out of Africa."⁶⁰

Montgomery had reason to be optimistic. Eighth Army faced the forces of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel,⁶¹ commander of the Axis Afrika Corps. Eighth Army outnumbered Rommel's forces four-to-one in personnel, five-to-one in combat aircraft, and six-to-one in tanks. Rommel was short of fuel, and the Allied command of the Mediterranean ensured that his logistical situation would be uncertain at best.

In planning the attack that came to be the Battle

of El Alamein, Montgomery wanted tactical surprise. The plan called for a deception in the south while his true main effort would be in the north. After engineers cleared lanes in the Axis minefields, infantry divisions were to push through. Tank formations were to follow the infantry.

The offensive began on October 23, 1942. Montgomery's forces met stiff resistance; German counterattacks blunted the attacks in the north. The battle raged on for eleven days without decision although both sides understood that Montgomery could afford to wage a war of attrition and Rommel could not.

On November 2d, Montgomery launched his "Operation Supercharge," a powerful thrust in the south against the Italian part of the defensive line. Within two days, Montgomery achieved his breakthrough. Rommel withdrew to the east. Montgomery had won at El Alamein.

Rommel, however, was far from being "hit right out of Africa." By conducting a series of withdrawals, he recovered to the point of achieving a stunning victory at Kasserine Pass in February, 1943.⁶² The Axis forces in North Africa were finally overwhelmed three months later.

Why did Montgomery not conduct an aggressive pursuit of Rommel immediately after his victory at El

Alamein? Historians still debate this question. Responses generally fall into one of two categories: either Montgomery could not rigorously pursue, or he did not have the will to pursue.

During the crucial period of November 2 - 4, Montgomery had the advantage of reading the products of Ultra, the project that broke the codes of high level German communications. He knew that Rommel had notified Hitler on November 2d that the Axis forces at El Alamein were exhausted, short of fuel, and could not continue to defend. He read Rommel's warning that "the possibility of annihilation of the army must be faced."⁶³ Finally, Montgomery knew that, after ordering Rommel to fight to the death, Hitler at last granted Rommel permission to withdraw on November 4th.

The tactical situation confirmed these Ultra transcripts. By November 4th, Eighth Army had captured over 30,000 prisoners. The number of destroyed German tanks on the battlefield indicated that Rommel had precious few tanks left.

All signs pointed to an opportunity for Montgomery to destroy the small Axis force that remained. However, he seemed unwilling to exploit his success. The commanders of 1st Armored Division and 10th Armored Division both requested the supplies necessary to thrust forward and cut Rommel off, but Montgomery

turned down these requests.⁶⁴ Montgomery also rejected a proposal from his Chief of Staff, Major General Sir Francis de Guingand, to create an encircling force.⁶⁵ Eighth Armored Division, "uncommitted and well equipped," never received the mission to chase Rommel's fleeing forces. Major General Francis Tucker, commander of 4th Indian Division, had even prepared his troops to drive towards the Halfaya Pass to cut Rommel off, but Montgomery determined that it was more important that the division remain on salvage duty, cleaning up the battlefield debris.⁶⁶ X Corps, labelled as a "corps de chasse," conducted only limited thrusts toward the coast road. Envelopment maneuvers on November 5th and 6th were too shallow to catch Rommel's withdrawing forces.

On November 7th, torrential rains hit the region, turning the desert into a quagmire. Wheeled resupply vehicles could not get forward. Montgomery and his supporters would cite the rain as the excuse for Rommel's escape, "but the opportunity had been lost long before."⁶⁷

Certainly there were reasons, in addition to the infamous rain, that kept Montgomery from conducting an aggressive pursuit. The demand for fuel, even without the rain, overburdened the logistical system. Eighth Army's traffic control was a nightmare as large

formations tried to negotiate breached minefields and clogged roads. Units attempting night movement often got lost.

These problems, however, are due less to the friction of war than to a lack of planning for a pursuit operation. When Montgomery addressed his troops on three occasions before the battle, "he had scarcely mentioned the chase which must follow the slugging match."⁶⁸ During a newspaper interview on November 5th, Montgomery stated, "I did not hope for such a complete victory; or rather I hoped for it but I did not expect it."⁶⁹ Given the picture that Ultra and other sources provided him, it is curious why he would not have expected such great success.

What is even more curious is that Montgomery let Rommel escape again later that month. On November 24th, Rommel established a hasty defense at El Agheila with only 30 tanks and 46 antitank guns. The British 7th Armored Division, with 170 tanks, approached Rommel's position, but Montgomery ordered the division not to attack. Montgomery, wishing to bring his entire army forward, began preparing for a deliberate attack on Rommel's position to be launched two weeks later. Montgomery then spent the weekend in Cairo. Two days before Eighth Army was to attack, Rommel withdrew another 250 miles to the east. The withdrawal caught

the British forces so off-guard that some of their tanks ran out of fuel trying to cut Rommel off once again.

Historian Alun Chalfont describes Montgomery's actions during and after El Alamein as "abysmal." Chalfont concludes, "Granted that the Army was tired, and that Rommel was in full flight, there is little justification for Montgomery's sluggish reaction."⁷⁰ Why was Montgomery so "sluggish"? It is apparent that he did not have the will to conduct a vigorous pursuit of Rommel, to destroy the Axis forces in short order.

Author Ronald Lewin notes that many of Montgomery's close comrades believed that after his first victory at Alam Halfa he was "condemned to success." From that point on, Montgomery would not take any risks.⁷¹ Montgomery himself wrote,

I was determined not to have any more setbacks in the desert war, and was not prepared to run undue risks during the long march to Tripoli and then on to Tunis. Moreover, I wanted as few casualties as possible."⁷²

These explanations, however, do not tell the entire story. Ultra and other intelligence sources kept Montgomery fully informed of Rommel's situation. After November 4th, Montgomery had a twenty-to-one superiority in ground forces over Rommel. Additionally, allowing Rommel to escape did indeed save casualties in Eighth Army, but it allowed Rommel to

inflict considerable casualties on the Allied forces at Kasserine Pass months later.

Moreover, Montgomery may not have felt the need to destroy Rommel at or near El Alamein. He knew that Operation Torch, the Anglo-American landings at Algeria and Morocco, meant that it was only a matter of time before the Axis forces in North Africa would be destroyed. The knowledge of Torch "seems to have put [Montgomery] under greater pressure to achieve a victory than to exploit it."⁷³

What is most revealing, however, is Montgomery's criticism of the Allied unconditional surrender policy. In January, 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met at Casablanca and announced this policy. Montgomery, in his book History of Warfare, wrote, "I have always considered this decision to have been a tragic mistake," asserting that the door for a negotiated settlement should have been left open."⁷⁴ Montgomery then quoted Lord Maurice Hankey as stating that the unconditional surrender policy, "so contrary to the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, did nothing to strengthen the moral position of the Allies."⁷⁵

The Casablanca Conference was held after El Alamein, but Montgomery's attitudes were most likely present on that battlefield. He showed by his actions,

again and again, that he did not have the will to conduct an aggressive pursuit of Rommel. His victory at El Alamein and the successful landings of Operation Torch demonstrated that the Allies had achieved dominance over Rommel and the Axis forces, at least for a time. Having achieved this dominance, Montgomery must have felt that a vigorous pursuit was not necessary. He therefore missed the chance to wipe out the entire Axis army in North Africa, potentially shortening the war by six months.

In another desert battle almost 50 years later, another opportunity for a tactical pursuit was not seized. The result of not pursuing, though, did not extend the length of the war, for President George Bush unilaterally stopped the conflict. The U.S.-led Coalition forces did not suffer the consequences, but the people of Iraq did.

C. DESERT STORM'S GROUND OFFENSIVE

On February 27, 1991, the situation in the Gulf War looked very good for the United States and its allies. The ground offensive was in its fourth day; casualties across the U.S.-led coalition were light. A month-long application of air power had taken its toll on Iraqi command and control and on the Iraqi will to

resist. Most of the Iraqi forces that had not surrendered were in full retreat. VII Corps had executed its now famous "left hook," and was in the process of completing the destruction of the remaining Republican Guard Forces.

That evening, President Bush announced that at midnight, eastern standard time, 100 hours after the ground operations had begun, all U.S. and Coalition forces would cease offensive operations. "It is up to Iraq," Bush said, "whether this suspension . . . becomes a permanent cease-fire."⁷⁶ Except for a firefight two days later between the 24th Mechanized Division and elements of the Republican Guard's Hammurabi Division, the cease-fire held, allowing the Coalition forces to secure Kuwait and liberate its citizens.

The timing of the cease-fire also allowed five Republican Guard divisions to escape "relatively intact." These forces fled back into Iraq with an estimated 700 tanks, 1430 armored vehicles, and over 110,000 soldiers.⁷⁷

When the Shiites and Kurds of Iraq rose up to overthrow Saddam Hussein, these very Republican Guard Forces brutally suppressed them. Within a month of Bush's cease-fire, the Republican Guard had slaughtered thousands. Over one-half million Kurdish refugees fled

to Turkey. Debate was already raging about the wisdom of a unilateral cease-fire that left Saddam Hussein in power. Its wisdom was now doubly challenged, for the cease-fire allowed for the escape of the Republican Guard and this ruthless aftermath.

General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander-in-chief, U.S. Central Command (CINCCENT), included in his mission statement the phrase "destroy the Republican Guard."⁷⁸ During the ground campaign he said that his mission demanded "that the Republican Guard is rendered incapable of conducting the type of heinous act that they've conducted so often in the past. . . ."⁷⁹ Why, then, did President Bush declare this cease-fire, thus forbidding the U.S.-led Coalition forces from pursuing the Republican Guard into Iraq? In this case, it was not the soldiers or the field commanders who had lost the will to pursue, but the leader at the strategic level of war: the President himself.

A few days after the Coalition Forces began to attack Iraq with its air power, President Bush delivered a speech to the National Religious Broadcasters. In that speech, he used just war doctrine to explain his actions in the Gulf War. Citing all seven just war principles, Bush declared that the war was for "the greater good" and that the war should be conducted "in proportion to the threat."

He went on to say that "we must act reasonably, humanely, and make every effort possible to keep casualties to a minimum."⁸⁰

As mentioned earlier,⁸¹ just war doctrine does not forbid a pursuit, but it certainly discourages it. In just war terms, the injustice was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Force, if used, is authorized only to correct the injustice. Once Iraqi forces had been expelled, just war doctrine held that the fighting must stop. Clearly George Bush was guided by such a thought process when he declared his unilateral cease-fire.

Additionally, there was the Mutla Ridge incident, also known as the "Highway to Hell" and the "Highway of Death." During the ground offensive, Coalition aviation caught a long line of vehicles, full of Iraqi soldiers and their Kuwaiti booty, along the highway back to Iraq. The aircraft attacked, wreaking massive destruction on the disorganized convoys. The ease and destructiveness of this attack showed decisively that Desert Storm was nowhere near a "fair fight." Bush became very concerned that the Coalition's military actions would be perceived as mass slaughter; as one journalist noted, such a perception "would tarnish victory's bloom and ricochet politically in the Congress and among America's Arab Coalition partners."⁸² Journalist Michael Evans wrote that,

despite arguments to continue the war and increase the likelihood of toppling Saddam, the Mutla Ridge incident "was one of the reasons for President Bush's decision to stop the war when he did."⁸³

Besides just war doctrine, then, Bush's decision can also be explained in a physiological sense. The Coalition had clearly achieved dominance over Saddam's forces. The great majority of Iraqi forces were sending submissive signals by either surrendering or fleeing. Further military action was clearly "unnecessary." General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke in support of the president, declaring that it would have been "un-American and un-chivalrous" for the Coalition to continue the war.⁸⁴ There was, therefore, little will to conduct a pursuit.

Certainly there were other factors that influenced the events of the Gulf War. For example, the Arab members of the U.S.-led coalition would most likely have had strong objections to a pursuit operation that went too far into Iraqi territory.⁸⁵ The fact remains, however, that attitudes of a chivalrous American way of war and an adherence to just war doctrine heavily influenced Bush's decision to end the war. Bush, as the leader of the Coalition, had clearly established his dominance; the will to pursue did not exist.

V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
THE ABSENCE OF WILL AND THE U.S. ARMY TODAY

In battle, the opportunity to pursue and destroy a fleeing enemy may present itself. Throughout Western military history, however, the victors have often failed to conduct an aggressive pursuit. In the mid-nineteenth century, Clausewitz noted this "spurious philosophy" of stopping the attack once the battle had been won. "Further bloodshed," he wrote, "was considered unnecessarily brutal."⁶⁶ In many cases, the reasons for this failure to pursue lie in the moral domain.

The first step in addressing this problem, then, is to recognize the problem. Understanding how we, as Westerners and as humans, will react to such a situation is crucial. As the three historical case studies show, physiological, traditional, and philosophical factors deter the will to pursue. We must address each factor so that the U.S. Army has the will to conduct vigorous pursuits.

How can we address the physiological influences? The key is to understand the interaction between man's biological and cultural norms. In war, these norms are in conflict; the biological norm forbids his killing of another man, yet his cultural norm demands such killing. Once the enemy shows submissiveness by

fleeing, the victor naturally believes that he has achieved dominance. The biological norm then takes control and the aggressive will ceases.

What leaders must do, then, is to ensure that the cultural norm remains dominant in combat. Leaders must understand that a successful pursuit can shorten the war and therefore resolve this conflict of norms. German tactician Albert Buddecke concluded that "an energetic pursuit avoids the necessity of battles."⁸⁷ If leaders can convince soldiers that Buddecke is correct, the soldiers' will to pursue can remain strong.⁸⁸

Of course, the field commanders must not lose the will to pursue either. Clausewitz notes that a commander who fully exploits his victory does so through his "ambition, energy, and quite possibly his callousness."⁸⁹ The general, mentally and physically fatigued, and perhaps basking in the glow of his battlefield victory, must remember that allowing the enemy to escape can have serious consequences. The commander must not be content, as Meade and Montgomery were, with a temporary dominance of the enemy; he must pursue to ensure that his dominance is permanent.

There are also traditional influences that the U.S. Army must address. From the times of the Ancient Greeks to the present, Western armies have had a desire

to limit warfare and its destructiveness. This desire discouraged vigorous pursuits. There have been, of course, extraordinary generals who routinely exploited their battlefield victories by conducting energetic pursuits. This desire to pursue, however, is a chief trait that made these men extraordinary. The Western military tradition is for the victor to be "content to remain in possession" of the battlefield.

The most effective way to counter these traditional influences is to create a new tradition: one that places importance on pursuit operations. The U.S. Army can establish this new tradition through training and doctrine.

An initial step, then, is to introduce pursuit operations in our training. Today, pursuit is almost an alien concept. Training exercises, whether on a map or in the field, rarely include the conduct of a pursuit. This training shortfall is due in part to our previous Cold War orientation on the Soviet Union. Soviet doctrine did not allow for a fighting withdrawal, but belts of defense. Except for forces in a security zone, Soviet forces were to hold their defensive positions until victory or death.⁹⁰ Since the Soviets seemingly would not flee the battlefield, the U.S. Army rarely trained to pursue.

In order for pursuit to play a greater role in our

training, it must also play a larger role in our doctrine. A doctrine founded on maneuver theory emphasizes the importance of the pursuit. In his argument for maneuver theory, Robert Leonhard states that the pursuit phase should be the first phase in the planning process (as opposed to actions on the objective). Without a likely chance for an exploitation and pursuit, Leonhard argues, maneuver theory dictates a decline of battle. Attrition theory, conversely, holds that the battle ends when the enemy withdraws; the next step is not pursuit, but preparing for the next battle (just as Montgomery did in North Africa). Leonhard points out that the U.S. Army today reinforces this attrition approach in its training by stopping the simulated battle for an after-action review. The result, he says, is to teach "in terms of battle instead of pursuit."⁹¹

What does the U.S. Army's most current doctrine (FM 100-5, Operations) say about the pursuit? It certainly does not place the same importance on the pursuit that Leonhard does. The manual states that

commanders can rarely anticipate pursuit, so they do not normally hold forces in reserve solely to accomplish this mission. Therefore, commanders must be agile enough to react when the situation presents itself.⁹²

The manual goes on to state that commanders should pursue "whenever possible." Additionally, commanders

should "select a combination" of the four forms of the tactical offense (movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit) "that provide the greatest advantage."⁹³

The contrasts here are striking. Leonhard's maneuver theory places critical importance on the pursuit: so much so that the pursuit is the first phase to be planned and, if pursuit is not possible, the commander should decline battle. The U.S. Army's doctrine, however, considers pursuit a rare occurrence that need not receive priority of planning or resources. In fact, pursuit is simply one of four options that allow the commander "the greatest advantage."

The purpose of this monograph is not to argue that Army doctrine should be based solely on maneuver theory, but rather that current doctrine does not emphasize enough the importance of pursuit. Commanders need to think about the pursuit first. Considerations should include not only whether a pursuit is in accordance with the political and military aims of the war, but also what the possible consequences will be if commanders do not conduct an aggressive pursuit. In many circumstances, commanders should continue to pressure the enemy until he is destroyed (through physical destruction or surrender). In other words,

one must apply overwhelming combat power until dominance is permanently established. The ancient Greeks rarely pursued because, in that society, winning the battle usually meant winning the entire war. In that era, dominance on the battlefield was permanent. In modern times, however, such is not the case.⁹⁴ Too often, as at Gettysburg and El Alamein, commanders have accepted a dominance that was only temporary, only to allow the enemy to continue to fight.

Finally, the U.S. Army must address the philosophical influences that deter the will to pursue. Just war doctrine, in its principle of proportionality, limits the amount of force that a nation may legitimately use to correct an injustice. President Bush used just war doctrine as his guide in leading the Gulf War Coalition. When he declared the cease-fire, Bush obviously believed that longer-term strategic goals (e.g., a more acceptable Iraqi regime) could be achieved through non-military means, with no more risk to the lives of Americans or Iraqis.⁹⁵

History will judge whether the cease-fire decision was a correct one in this long-term view. The escaping Republican Guard Forces slaughtered thousands of Kurds and Shiites; if groups in the Gulf region hold the U.S. responsible in some way, there may be political repercussions later. In addition, the possibility

exists that U.S. forces may once again have to return to the Persian Gulf region to defend Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.⁹⁶

There will be situations in which the civilian leadership will not support a pursuit for philosophical reasons. In such cases, commanders must be frank with these leaders in assessing the possible consequences of allowing the enemy to escape. Just war doctrine offers a means to limit wars and their destructiveness, but one must also remember Clausewitz's words:

Kind-hearted people might of course think that there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst.⁹⁷

One must wonder whether just war doctrine led us to the moral high ground in the Gulf War.

VI. CONCLUSION

Throughout Western military history, pursuit has been relatively rare. There are tactical, operational, and strategic reasons to explain why a victorious army did not pursue a fleeing opponent. These reasons, however, do not always provide a full explanation, for there have been cases in which an army simply lacked

the will to pursue.

This lack of will is the result of physiological, traditional, and philosophical factors. These factors are interrelated. Physiologically, men tend to become less aggressive once they believe that they have achieved dominance. One way that they know they dominate is witnessing the enemy surrender or run away. These physiological factors were evident in the ancient Greeks, from whom the Western world inherited many traditions. The Greeks avoided pursuit mainly because their society acknowledged the decision of a single battle; pursuit was therefore not necessary. Finally, these physiological and traditional influences, together with the emergence of Christianity, evolved into just war doctrine. This doctrine's principles aim to limit wars and their destructiveness, thus discouraging the chasing and destruction of a fleeing enemy.

These factors help to explain why pursuits rarely happen. The problem, though, is that allowing a fleeing enemy to escape can have serious consequences. After Gettysburg, Lee continued to fight for two more years. After El Alamein, Rommel emerged victorious at Kasserine Pass and the Allied campaign in North Africa went on for six more months. After Desert Storm, the Republican Guard units that escaped slaughtered

thousands of Shiites and Kurds.

Since lacking the will to pursue can have such serious consequences, the U.S. Army must come to better understand this dilemma. We must understand and address the physiological, traditional, and philosophical influences that deter our will to pursue. A reorientation of our training and doctrine is necessary. Most importantly, we must understand that, in war, our dominance must be permanent, not temporary.

ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 267.
2. Edward Luttwak and Stuart Koehl, The Dictionary of Modern War (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 471-472.
3. Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (London and New York: Methuen, 1981), 103.
4. Harry Holbert Turney-High, The Military: The Theory of Land Warfare as Behavioral Science (West Hanover, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 69-70. Turney-High cites "The Principle of Exploitation of Victory," but then equates it to Clausewitz's principle of the pursuit.
5. Clausewitz, 263-264.
6. Geoffrey Perret, A Country Made by War: From the Revolution to Vietnam -- The Story of America's Rise to Power (New York: Random House, 1989), 182.
7. Archer Jones, The Art of War in the Western World (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 667-668. Jones concludes that the retreat holds supremacy over the pursuit.
8. W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War: Part IV (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 45.
9. Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober, The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 119.
10. George T. Dennis, trans., Three Byzantine Military Treatises (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1985), 115, 119, and 121.
11. Strauss and Ober, 127-128.
12. David H. Zook and Robin Higham, A Short History of Warfare (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1966), 234.
13. Quoted in Hans Delbruck, History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History, vol. IV, The Modern Era, trans. Walter J. Renfro, Jr., (Westport,

CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 304.

14. Clausewitz, 263-264.

15. Ibid., 263-264. Clausewitz's comments are based on his personal observations during the Napoleonic Wars and on his studies of Frederick the Great. Additionally, historian Archer Jones notes that many U.S. Civil War commanders chose to rest their troops rather than to pursue. See Archer Jones, Civil War Command and Strategy: The Process of Victory and Defeat (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 36.

16. Clausewitz, 266.

17. Robert Ardrey, African Genesis: A Personal Investigation into the Animal Origins and Nature of Man (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1961), 91. Ardrey's conclusions are based on his personal observations and on his research of animal behavioral studies. He cites the hierarchical structure of chickens: the pecking order. In this order, a chicken may not peck another that is higher on this hierarchical scale.

Zoologist Desmond Morris also notes that animals have a system of dominance, but contends that not all species have "violently dictatorial" societies. Such societies do have tyrants, but some of these tyrants are benign. Even so, the tyrant is prepared to exert his authority with violence under certain conditions. See Desmond Morris, The Naked Ape: A Zoologist's Study of the Human Animal (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), 120-121.

18. Morris, 120. For a more extensive discussion of intraspecific aggression, see also Richard A. Gabriel, The Culture of War: Invention and Early Development (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990). The discussion on animal aggression is a summation of the Morris and Gabriel works.

19. Murder for personal gain or personal pleasure are also types of aggression, but lie outside the purview of this monograph.

20. Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals, and Aggression (New York: The Viking Press, 1979).

21. Gabriel, 12.

22. Ibid., 13.

23. Ibid., 12.
24. Ibid., 94.
25. Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 17.
26. See Pritchett, 16-20. Pritchett documents seventeen known cases of monomachia and states that there are "doubtless other examples."
27. Hanson, 209.
28. Ibid., 4.
29. Gabriel, 90.
30. Hanson, 223.
31. Ibid., 36.
32. Pierre L. Van den Berghe, "Dimensions for Comparing Military Organizations" in War: A Historical, Political, and Social Study, ed. L. L. Farrar, Jr., (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1978), 38. The chivalric codes represented an attempt to wage war in accordance with Christian doctrine. The codes also ensured that the noblemen warriors would not kill each other to the point of extinction of their upper class. See Richard A. Preston, Alex Roland, and Sydney F. Wise, Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships with Western Society, 5th ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1991), 64-67.
33. James Turner Johnson and George Weigel, Just War and the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1991), 6.
34. Alan Geyer and Barbara G. Green, Lines in the Sand: Justice and the Gulf War (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), 147.
35. Johnson and Weigel, 31.
36. F. L. Taylor, The Art of War in Italy 1494 - 1529 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921; repr., London: Greenhill Books, 1993), 113.

37. The Battle of Gettysburg was fought 1-3 July 1863. General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, had invaded the North in an attempt to break the fighting spirit of the Union and thus end the Civil War on terms favorable to the Confederate States of America. Lee's army fought General George G. Meade's Union Army of the Potomac near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania for three days. On the third day, Lee attempted to break the Union defensive lines with an attack into the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. The attack failed. Lee chose to withdraw to the south to reorganize and replenish his beaten army.

38. George Edward Pickett, a Confederate division commander at Gettysburg, was a 1846 graduate of West Point. He received an infantry commission and served in the Mexican-American War. In June 1861 he resigned his commission in the United States Army to accept an appointment as a Confederate colonel. He rose to the rank of major general and became a division commander in October, 1862. The attack he led on the Union lines at Gettysburg became known as Pickett's Charge.

39. Robert Edward Lee was a West Point graduate of 1829. He was commissioned as an engineer officer and later fought in the Mexican-American War. In 1852 he became superintendent of West Point, serving for three years. In April, 1861 he resigned his commission to serve in the Confederate Army. In the spring of 1862 he assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia and fought several successful battles in Virginia and Maryland. Despite his loss at Gettysburg, he continued to command the Army of Northern Virginia until the end of the Civil War.

40. George Gordon Meade graduated from West Point in 1835. Commissioned as an artillery officer, he served in the Second Seminole War. He left the United States Army in 1836 to be a civil engineer. He rejoined the Army in 1842 and later served in the Mexican-American War. During the Civil War he fought in the Peninsula Campaign (April-July 1862) as a brigade commander, in the Battle of Fredericksburg (December 1862) as a division commander, then in the Battle of Chancellorsville (April-May 1863) as a corps commander. On June 28, 1863 he assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, just three days before the Battle of Gettysburg began.

41. Quoted in Richard Wheeler, Voices of the Civil War (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976), 325. Wheeler's sources are letters and publications of Civil

War participants and observers.

42. Quoted in Wheeler, 327.

43. Perret, 227-228.

44. Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 65. Linderman's conclusions on the attitudes of Civil War soldiers are based on his study of the letters, diaries, memoirs, and other first-person historical accounts of the participants of that conflict.

45. See the section "Physiological Influences," pp. 6-11.

46. Perret, 191.

47. Linderman, 66-67, 72.

48. Ibid., 71.

49. Ibid., 71.

50. Ibid., 66.

51. Ibid., 68-69.

52. Opportunities to pursue a fleeing enemy also arose after the Battles of First Bull Run, Yorktown/Williamsburg, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga. The war's only successful pursuit was Ulysses S. Grant's chasing of Lee which ended at Appomattox. The success of this pursuit forced the Confederacy to surrender.

53. R. Ernest Dupuy, Men of West Point: The First 150 Years of the United States Military Academy (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1951), 68.

54. Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, vol. 2, Fredericksburg to Meridian (New York: Random House, 1963), 586.

55. Quoted in Robert Leckie, None Died in Vain: The Saga of the American Civil War (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), 539.

56. Quoted in Foote, 587.

57. Quoted in Wheeler, 327.

58. Quoted in Dupuy, 68.

59. Bernard Law Montgomery was a veteran of World War I. In the 1930s he served in various military assignments in the Middle East, including division command in Palestine. Montgomery, while commanding 3d Division, fought as the rear guard at Dunkirk, buying time for the encircled Allied forces to escape to England. His gallantry at Dunkirk earned him the knighthood. He went on to serve as a corps commander twice before receiving the appointment to be Eighth Army's commander as a Lieutenant General. He was promoted to General one week after the Battle of El Alamein and became a Field Marshal in September, 1944.

60. Bernard Law Montgomery, A History of Warfare (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1968), 513.

61. Erwin Rommel joined the 124th Wurttemberg Regiment as an officer-aspirant in 1910. He fought in France and in Italy during World War I. He rose through the ranks of the German Army, becoming a major general in 1939. The next year, he led 7th Panzer Division in the invasion of France. He landed at Tripoli in February, 1941 to be the commander of Afrika Corps. He left North Africa in March, 1943; although officially this departure was because of his ill health, there was also a desire in Germany to save his reputation when the German effort in North Africa became a lost cause.

62. The slowness of Montgomery's pursuit allowed Rommel to withdraw to Mareth and establish defenses there. Montgomery's Eighth Army reached Medenine, less than 20 miles southeast of the Mareth Line, on February 16, 1943. Instead of attacking, however, Montgomery established defensive prepared positions. Montgomery's actions allowed Rommel the freedom to lead a detachment of his Afrika Corps in an attack against U.S. 2d Corps at Kasserine. Rommel then returned to Mareth and attacked Montgomery on March 6th.

63. A. Hillgruber, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, vol. ii (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard & Graefer, 1963), 894, quoted in Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), 165.

64. R. W. Thompson, Churchill and the Montgomery Myth (New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1967), 151.

65. Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War: The First Account of World War II's Greatest Secret Based on Official Documents (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1978), 514.
66. Alun Chalfont, Montgomery of Alamein (New York: Atheneum, 1976), 192.
67. Ibid., 192.
68. Ibid., 191.
69. Nigel Hamilton, Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years 1942-1944 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1983), 8. Hamilton's source is a Daily Telegraph (London) report of a Montgomery address to allied war correspondents on November 5, 1942.
70. Chalfont, 191.
71. Lewin, 269.
72. Montgomery, A History of Warfare, 514.
73. Lewin, 269.
74. Montgomery, A History of Warfare, 511.
75. Maurice Pascal Alers Hankey, Politics, Trials and Errors (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1950), 125-126, quoted in Montgomery, A History of Warfare, 511.
76. George Bush, "Kuwait Is Liberated," televised address, 27 February 1991, quoted in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions (New York: Times Books, 1991), 450.
77. Jeffrey Record, Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1993), 125. The five divisions Record lists are the Adnana, Nebuchadnezzar, Al Faw, 8th Special Forces, and part of the Hammurabi.
The exact figures Record lists are subject to dispute. Geyer and Green (p. 150) estimate that only forty to fifty thousand Republican Guard troops escaped. There is no doubt, however, that the Republican Guards forces that did escape were the same forces that slaughtered thousands of Shiites and Kurds within a month after the cease-fire. See also Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry, Jr., and Norman Polmar, CNN: War in the Gulf (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, Inc., 1991), 221 and Roland Dannreuther, The Gulf Conflict: A

Political and Strategic Analysis (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), 57.

78. U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25) (Washington: GPO, April 1992), 73.

79. "The Gates Are Closed," Daily Telegraph (London), 27 February 1991, in Brian MacArthur, ed., Despatches from the Gulf War (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd., 1991), 241-242.

80. George Bush, "Address by President Bush to National Religious Broadcasters," January 28, 1991, quoted in Geyer and Green, 148. The complete text of this address is in Johnson and Weigel, 141-146. In this speech, Bush cited just cause, right intention, the goal of peace, proportionality, legitimate authority, war as a last resort, and the reasonable hope for success: the seven principles of just war doctrine.

81. See the section "Philosophical Influences," p. 14-16.

82. Record, 126.

83. Michael Evans, "The Final Turkey Shoot," The Times (London), 27 March 1991, in MacArthur, 274.

84. Douglas Waller and John Barry, "The Day We Stopped the War," Newsweek, 20 January 1992, 18, in Record, 127.

85. Norman Schwarzkopf was well aware of the reluctance that the Arab partners of the Coalition had about attacking another Arab nation. His assessment is that an attack deep into Iraq would have led to the Coalition's dissolution. See H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Linda Grey Bantam Books, 1992), 498.

86. Clausewitz, 265. Interestingly, Clausewitz believed that the pursuit was becoming a more popular and common feature of European warfare of his day.

87. Albert Buddecke, Tactical Decisions and Orders: A Study in Troop-Leading (Based on the Operations of an Independent Division) for Individual Instruction, trans. A. L. Conger (Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson

Publishing Co., 1908), 35.

88. The thought of ending the war sooner is a potentially powerful motivator. In a survey, World War II veterans who fought in North Africa and Sicily were asked: "Generally, in your combat experience, what was most important to you in making you want to keep going and do as well as you could?" Thirty-four percent of the respondents (the largest group) answered "thoughts of getting the war over." The next largest group--fourteen percent--cited "solidarity with [the] group." See Samuel A. Stouffer, et. al., Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, vol. 2, The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 109.

89. Clausewitz, 264.

90. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, "FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics," Final Draft (Unedited) (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 18 June 1990), p. 4-122.

91. Robert R. Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), 112.

92. U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), p. 7-9.

93. Ibid., p. 7-11.

94. For an explanation of the change in the nineteenth century from classical warfare to modern warfare, see James J. Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art," Theoretical Paper No. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 16 June 1991). Schneider points out that as weapons became more lethal, soldiers began to disperse in order to survive. Paradoxically, this greater lethality meant fewer casualties. Modern armies, then, became much more difficult to destroy in a single decisive battle.

Schneider's arguments may lead one to believe that pursuit in modern times is worthless, for the modern army is virtually indestructible. The opposite, however, is true; the robustness of such armies makes pursuit all the more important. When the enemy force flees, it is at its most vulnerable stage. The chances to destroy it are never better.

95. Dannreuther (p. 73) cites Bush's desire to save American lives. President Bush, in his announcement of the cease-fire, declared his concern about Iraqi casualties as well. Stating that his "quarrel" was not with the Iraqi people but with Saddam Hussein, Bush said, "You, the people of Iraq, are not our enemy. We do not seek your destruction." See Sifry and Cerf, 450.

96. Record, 159.

97. Clausewitz, 75.

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